Summary

BRICS central banks have expanded gold holdings sharply since 2022, driven by sanctions risk, currency diversification, and reduced confidence in dollar-denominated reserves. China and India lead the accumulation, while Russia has recently turned seller. The shift alters reserve composition globally and provides structural support beneath gold prices.

Introduction to BRICS Nations and Their Gold Buying Spree

BRICS originally comprised Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Later, after 2024, the bloc expanded to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia, with several other states as partner states.

BRICS members have increased their gold purchases. That trend continued into February 2022, when Western governments froze roughly USD 300 billion of Russian central bank assets. This shows that holding foreign exchange reserves in another jurisdiction’s currency involves political risk in addition to market risk.

The response is measured. In recent years, official-sector gold demand has remained elevated, with emerging-market central banks among the major buyers. Central bank gold demand was initially estimated at 244 tonnes in the first quarter of 2026, but the World Gold Council later revised the figure to 57 tonnes.

Examining the Economic Factors Behind Gold Acquisition

Several conditions explain the scale of gold purchases by BRICS countries. 

Sanctions Exposure

Reserves held as US Treasury securities or European sovereign debt can restrict access during political tensions. Gold held in domestic vaults cannot be frozen by an external authority. This distinction has become central to reserve management in countries with strained relations with Western governments.

Currency Concentration Risk

The dollar remains the dominant reserve currency, though its share of allocated global reserves has declined over two decades. Central banks holding heavy dollar positions face exposure to US monetary policy, fiscal trajectory, and interest rate decisions over which they have no influence.

Absence of Counterparty Risk

Gold represents no claim on any government or institution. A sovereign bond depends on the issuer’s willingness and capacity to pay. Physical gold does not.

Inflation and Fiscal Concerns

Persistent fiscal deficits across major economies have raised questions about long-term currency purchasing power. Gold has historically preserved value across such periods, which explains its appeal as a reserve asset.

Portfolio Diversification

Gold’s price movement shows low correlation with the dollar and with sovereign bonds. Adding it lowers overall reserve volatility without introducing credit exposure.

Geopolitical Uncertainty

Conflicts across the Middle East and Eastern Europe have raised the value that reserve managers place on assets requiring no counterparty performance.

Detailed Analysis of Each BRICS Nation’s Gold Acquisition

Behavior varies significantly across the founding members, and aggregate figures conceal important differences. The World Gold Council compiles official holdings and monthly changes for gold reserves by country from IMF statistics.

China

The People’s Bank of China is the bloc’s most systematic buyer. Official data placed holdings near 2,366 tonnes at the end of July 2026, the twenty-first consecutive monthly increase and the longest recorded streak since disclosure began in 1999. Despite this scale, bullion represents under 10 percent of total reserves, well below the allocations maintained by major Western institutions. That composition gap implies a multi-year accumulation horizon.

India

The Reserve Bank of India held 880.52 tonnes as of end-March 2026, of which 680.05 tonnes were stored domestically. Two developments define the Indian approach:

• Repatriation: The domestically vaulted share has risen substantially over two years, reducing custody risk.
• Valuation effect: Tonnage barely changed during the year, yet bullion’s share of total foreign exchange reserves climbed toward 17 percent as prices advanced.

Russia

Russia holds among the largest reserves within the bloc, at approximately 2,330 tonnes. Its position has reversed direction. Facing fiscal pressure and restricted access to foreign currency, Russia became one of the two largest sellers of central bank gold globally in early 2026, alongside Turkey.

This illustrates gold’s dual function: a geopolitical hedge during stable periods and a liquidity source during fiscal stress.

Brazil

Brazil holds approximately 170 tonnes, a modest position relative to its economy. Reserve policy has prioritized dollar liquidity, and gold accumulation has not matched the pace set by China or India.

South Africa

South Africa holds roughly 125 tonnes. As a major gold producer, its central bank has maintained rather than aggressively expanded its position.

Expanded Membership

Among newer members, the United Arab Emirates has increased holdings steadily, Egypt holds approximately 127 tonnes, and Indonesia has emerged as a buyer after years of inactivity. Saudi Arabia, which holds partner status, retains approximately 323 tonnes at just 2.6% of reserves, leaving considerable scope for expansion.

Unveiling the Underlying Reasons for Gold Acquisition Among BRICS Nations

The connection between de-dollarisation and gold requires precision. Central banks are not abandoning the dollar. They are reducing their proportional weight within reserve portfolios.

Reducing Vulnerability to Sanctions

The 2022 asset freeze established that reserves denominated in another jurisdiction’s currency can be immobilized. Gold held domestically removes this exposure entirely.

Supporting Alternative Settlement Arrangements

BRICS members have expanded bilateral trade settlement in local currencies. Credible gold reserves strengthen confidence in a currency used for cross-border settlement, even where no gold convertibility exists.

Establishing Long-Term Positions

Central bank purchases are policy decisions rather than trades. Sovereign buyers show limited price sensitivity, which is why accumulation continued through 2025 and 2026 despite gold reaching successive record levels.

Correcting Historical Underallocation

Western central banks hold large gold positions accumulated over the preceding century. Emerging economies with far larger current reserve pools hold proportionally less. Much of the current buying reflects convergence toward comparable allocation levels.

Preparing for Reserve System Change

Several reserve managers anticipate a more fragmented international monetary arrangement over the coming decades. Gold functions in any such arrangement, since it depends on no single issuer.

What It Means for the Global Economy

Price Support

Official-sector demand has become a structural component of the gold market. The World Gold Council forecasts approximately 850 tonnes of central bank purchases in 2026, against annual mine production of nearly 3,900 tonnes. A buyer absorbing roughly one-fifth of new supply, with limited price sensitivity, establishes a firm demand floor.

Reserve Composition Shift

Gold reserves by country data indicate a gradual redistribution. Western economies still hold the largest absolute quantities, though emerging market shares have grown consistently over the past decade.

Dollar Implications

The effect on the dollar is incremental rather than abrupt. Dollar dominance rests on the depth of US financial markets, the extent of dollar-denominated trade invoicing, and network effects. Gold accumulation reduces marginal demand for dollar assets without displacing the currency.

Consequences for Investors

Sustained official-sector demand alters the character of the gold market. Prices have historically been driven by jewelry demand and investment flows, both of which respond to price. Central bank demand does not, which reduces the depth of price corrections.

Signal Value

Reserve managers with access to detailed macroeconomic information are collectively increasing exposure to an asset that produces no yield. That allocation decision provides private investors with an indication of how reserve managers perceive long-term currency risk. 

Conclusion: Evaluating the Long-Term Impacts of BRICS Gold Accumulation

The pattern of BRICS countries buying gold reflects a reassessment of reserve risk rather than a coordinated campaign against the dollar. Members act individually, with different motivations and at different speeds. China accumulates gradually from a low base. India combines accumulation with repatriation. Russia has become a seller under fiscal pressure. Brazil and South Africa have remained largely inactive.

Three conclusions follow. Sanctions risk has become a standard input in reserve management, which supports continued gold demand independent of price. The proportional gap between emerging market and Western allocations leaves substantial room for further purchases. And official-sector buying provides structural support beneath gold prices that did not exist a decade ago.

For private investors, the implication is not that gold will rise indefinitely. Central-bank demand remains an important source of support for the gold market, although purchases can change in response to prices, liquidity needs and reserve-management considerations.

Final Highlights

• Global central banks purchased roughly 850 tonnes of gold in 2025, extending a buying streak that began in 2022.
• The People’s Bank of China held 2,313 tonnes at the end of Q1 2026, approximately 9% of its total reserves.
• The Reserve Bank of India repatriated close to 274 tonnes from overseas vaults between March 2023 and September 2025.
• The World Gold Council expects central-bank gold demand to remain strong in 2026, although annual demand is expected to finish below the 2025 total.